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CAN A EUROPEAN MONETARY FUND ADDRESS 
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE EUROZONE? 
INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal laxity, disregard for the budgetary discipline rules of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) and banking sector immoderation have pushed some of the Euro area Member States 
into insolvency in the sovereign debt stage of the financial crisis.1 The crisis that engulfed 
Europe in 2009 was no exception to the empirical rule that “severe financial disruptions tend 
to be followed by public debt explosions, which are apt to develop into sovereign debt 
crisis.”2 
Given the enormous disruptions generated by the contradiction between the centralization of 
monetary policy for the Euro area Member States and the descentralization of fiscal policy, 
left in the hands of national authorities and to the vagaries of the domestic political process in 
each of the Member States,3 greater fiscal harmonization led by appropriate political will is 
essential to the future of the European Union.   
For this reason, this paper examines two measures in response to the European sovereign debt 
crisis aimed at achieving closer fiscal union. The first is the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), which provides financial assistance to Euro area Member States beset by 
budgetary difficulties. The second, not yet acted upon, contemplates the establishment of a 
                                                 
1 Athanassiou, Phoebus “Of past measures and future plans for Europe´s exit from the sovereign debt crisis: what 
is leaglly possible (and what is not)” European Law Review 2011. Many of the arguments in this documents are 
drawn from this insightful article. 
2 Reinhart, C.M. & K.S. Rogoff “This time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly” Princeton 2009, 
Princeton University Press.  
3 Athanassiou, supra n.1. 




European Monetary Fund (EMF) as a permanent Euro area support fund to be based on the 
EFSF. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the suitability of the establishment of a European 
Monetary Fund as a measure to avoid future crises. Special attention will be paid to the legal 
basis and feasibility of the measures in question, since a “liberal approach toward rules 
(whether those of budgetary discipline, risk management, prudential supervision or common 
sense)”4 has contributed, to a great extent, to the present crisis.  
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part addresses the measures taken and 
proposals made in response to the sovereign default stage of the financial crisis in the Euro 
area. The second examines features and legal aspects of the European Financial Stability 
Facility, and the third analyzes the different aspects involved in the establishment of a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) as a policy to prevent similar crises. Finally, a brief 
conclusion is offered. 
REFORMS TO ADDRESS THE WEAKNESSES OF THE EUROZONE 
Given the unsustainable level of debt present in some of the periphery countries, reforms 
related to macroeconomic, structural and institutional policies must be considered.5 These 
should deal with main four areas:  
1. Addressing the problems with the banks and establishing the true scale of its fiscal problem 
To begin with, as far as banking problems are concerned, the periphery economies are divided 
into two groups. In the first, constituted by Greece and Portugal, the public sector is 
overleveraged, but the banking sector is comparatively low, whereas in the second - Ireland 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Llewellyn, Preston & Jon Peace “Policy challenges: the crisis and longer term” ” in Nomura Global Economics 
Europa will work (March 2011). A great deal of the information in this section has been drawn from this paper.  




and Spain -, public sector debt is comparatively low, but the banking system is perceived by 
investors to be insolvent. 
In the case of Ireland, “the huge liabilities of Irish banks relative to GDP illustrate why the 
economy sought external support from the EFSF. Even after forcing equity and junior debt 
holders to take write-downs, Ireland’s authorities were unwilling or unable to bankrupt the 
banks and force senior debt holders to share the burden. Hence the amount of capital that is 
needed to be injected into the Irish banks to write down bad assets and to recapitalize the 
banking system to maintain it as a going concern is more than the country can raise.”6 
As for Spanish banks, they constitute the main concern of the markets at present. “Following 
the housing market boom and bust, and with economic growth weak and unemployment high, 
the market is concerned that credit losses may overwhelm the thin capital bases of the 
country’s numerous savings banks, which account for around half of the system’s assets. The 
Bank of Spain has already taken several steps to improve the health of the banking sector, 
including mandating increased provisioning, forcing the merger of several savings banks, and 
establishing a fund, the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB), which has injected 
several billion euros of capital into the smaller banks. Recapitalization is required… to reopen 
access to the private sector funding markets. Without this, the liabilities could fall to the state 
(which, like Ireland, might not be credibly able to extend the guarantee) or to private sector 
debt holders, which could cause a chain of defaults on a scale not seen since the fall of 
Lehman Brothers. The cost of recapitalizing the bank system in Spain is manageable at up to 
€80bn, or under 8% of GDP. The issue is whether Spain might in the short term need to avail 
itself of the “increased flexibility” promised for the EFSF to effect this capital injection 
because the FROB is currently unfunded.”7 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 




The bank stress tests8 conducted in March 2011 by the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
on 91 banks from across Europe found that the majority of European banks were adequately 
capitalized. Only nine banks failed those tests with a core tier one capital ratio – a key 
measure of financial strength – of less than 5 per cent. However, since an all-out default of 
Greek sovereign debt is not factored into the tests, the market reaction has not been as 
expected.9 
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the real merit of the tests is the data disclosed 
alongside the results. Banks were forced to publish details of their holdings on sovereign 
bonds and credit exposures country by country. Investors, concerned about the 
macroeconomic, “top-down” approach, “remain skeptical that banks can withstand the losses 
of a default by a European government, and whether they would be able to cope with the 
accompanying disruption in the short-term funding market.”10  
Moreover, bankers and analysts identified liquidity and banks’ ability to fund themselves in 
sharply deteriorating markets as the main concern. Recently, the head of the IMF pointed out 
that “the common problem facing the developed world is an excessive overhang of claims on 
debt that financed worthless investments. These claims will have to be liquidated, and the 
quicker the better”.11 She also suggested some form of mandatory recapitalization, potentially 
using the EFSF to make direct capital injections into the region’s weakest banks.12 Another 
alternative to consider is the recapitalization of banks through “mandatory debt to equity 
swaps that put unsecured bondholders where they belong – behind both taxpayers and 
                                                 
8 The stress test objective is “to provide policymakers with information to assess the robustness of the EU 
banking system against adverse economic developments and the ability of individual EU banks to absorb 
potential shocks to the balance sheets, including sovereign debt risk. Source: Alexander, Kern “Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring in the EU: lessons from the Recent Crisis” in  Delimatisis, P & Herger, Nils Financial Regulation 
at the Roads. Implications for Supervision, Institutional Design and Trade (Kluwer 2011). 
9 Jenkins, Patrick “Europe stress test undermined by indecision“ Financial Times (London, 18 July 2011). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Financial Times “Lagarde´s ugly truth on debt” (London, 28 August 2011).  
12 Murphy; Spiegel & Atkins “Lagarde call surprises regulators” Financial Times (London, 28 August 2011). 




depositors”, in order to avoid taxpayers acting “as unpaid lifeguards for the financial 
system.”13 
As European Union law was designed to deal only with imbalances in the public sector but 
not with the excesses in the banking sector, “eurozone banks became among the world’s most 
over-leveraged, and they remain in need of protection from counterparty risks. The first step 
was taken by authorizing the European financial stability facility to rescue banks. Now banks’ 
equity capital levels need to be greatly increased. If an agency is to guarantee banks’ 
solvency, it must oversee them too. A powerful European banking agency could end the 
incestuous relationship between banks and regulators, while interfering much less with 
nations’ sovereignty than dictating their fiscal policies.”14 
2. Overcoming the private-public debt dynamics within a number of the periphery economies 
In order to overcome the dynamics of debt once the scale of the public debt is known, it is 
necessary: 
a) To move and maintain a primary surplus. Increases in taxation and reductions in 
government are required to move and maintain a primary surplus. Not only the size, 
but also the form, of the fiscal retrenchment must be considered. “Fiscal consolidation 
that cut expenditure, rather than raise taxes, produce, in general, a better growth 
outcome over the long term.”15 
b) To lower the starting burden of debt.16 In this regard, a soft restructuring of the bail-
out countries´ debt has been implemented. The greater flexibility given to the EFSF 
                                                 
13 See footnote 13. 
14 Soros, George “Three steps to resolving the eurozone crisis” Financial Times (London, 14 August 2011). 
15 Lewellyn & Peace, supra n.5 
16 The scale of cross-border dependencies has determined that eurozone governments have not required holders 
of government debt to suffer any loss. “For example, at the end of 2009 French banks were heavily exposed to 
the sovereign debt of Greece, holding €11.6bn (6% of their Tier 1 capital).97 German banks were also heavily 
exposed, holding €18.7bn (12% of their Tier 1 capital) of Greek public debt, €12.9bn (8% of Tier 1 capital) of 




has involved maturities being extended - from 7.5. years to at least 15 -  and interest 
rates being lowered to about 3.5 per cent. 
c) To reach the lowest possible cost of borrowing. This will depend on the credibility of 
the policy package. Such credibility requires “a technically feasible fiscal plan, usually 
accompanied by a long-term program of structural reform and visibly solid political 
commitment.”17 
Another issue to consider is the role played by rating agencies. Since the cost of 
borrowing is highly determined by rating agencies, “the clear statement that public 
authorities should place less reliance on private rating agencies – the European Central 
Bank (ECB) should not delegate responsibility to judging what is and is not acceptable 
as collateral – was long overdue, especially given the rating agencies’ terrible record 
in making judgments and the continued flaws in governance (often being paid by those 
that they are asked to rate).” 18  
“If the ECB is concerned that a credit event will lead to turmoil in financial markets, it 
should take a more active stance to address the underlying problems:  eliminating the 
non-transparent over-the-counter derivatives, ensuring that banks are adequately 
capitalized and preventing banks from being excessively interconnected.”19 
Moreover, the Governing Council of the ECB has established through a decision20, a 
securities markets program (SMP) for the “conduct of outright purchases, by national 
central banks (NCBs) and the ECB, of eligible market debt instruments.” The stated 
objective of the SMP was to ease “severe tensions in certain market segments” as well 
                                                                                                                                                        
Irish public debt, €10.9bn (7% of Tier 1 capital) of Portuguese public debt and, most strikingly, €31.9bn (21% of 
Tier 1 capital) of Spanish public debt”. Source: Lewellyn & Peace, supra n.5. 
17 Lewellyn & Peace, supra n.5 
18 Stiglitz, Joseph “Europe finally admits its debt problem to save the euro” Financial Times (London, 22 July 
2011). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Decision of the European Central Bank of May 14, 2010 establishing a securities markets program [2010] OJ 
L124/8. 




as to “address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate 
monetary policy transmission mechanism” necessary for the effective conduct of the 
single monetary policy.21 The scope of the market interventions conducted under the 
SMP covered the purchase on the secondary market of eligible marketable debt 
instruments issued by the central governments or public entities of Euro area Member 
States and, on the primary and secondary markets, of eligible marketable debt 
instruments issued by private entities incorporated in the Euro area.”22 
The Eurosystem's competence to establish and implement the SMP was challenged 
before the German Federal Constitutional Court, as part of a “wider constitutional 
challenge of Germany's participation in the European rescue packages for Greece and 
the Euro area. This was premised on the contention that, in agreeing to the extension 
of financial assistance, Germany and the Eurogroup members violated the claimants' 
fundamental rights arising from some of the basic principles of the German 
Constitution (including the principle of representation of the German people and the 
Constitution's respect of the fundamental right to property) as well as the no-bail out 
clause.”23 
d) To achieve the fastest economic growth. This is essential to reaching long-run 
sustainability of debt positions. To that end, it is required: “[to lower] the primary 
deficit – by closing the output gap, and thereby eliminating the cyclical component of 
the primary deficit; [to diminish] the snowball – by creating a more favorable interest 
rate/growth rate differential; and [to minimize] stock-flow adjustments – by helping to 
                                                 
21 ECB Decision [2010] OJ L124/8 Recitals 2 and 3. 
22 ECB Decision [2010] OJ L124/8 arts 1 and 2. 
23 While the Court's ruling was still pending at the time of writing, an application for interim measures was 
rejected by the Court (BVerG, May Page127, 2010, 2 BvR 987/10; BVerG, June 9, 2010, 2 BvR 1099/10). For 
an account of the challenges pending before the German Constitutional Court, and an assessment of the 
likelihood of their success, see Deutsche Bank Research, “Constitutional complaints -- German rejection 
ofrescue packs unlikely”, Research Briefing (March 17, 2011), at 
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR…EN…/PROD0000000000271154.pdf [Accessed July 7, 2011]. Source: 
Athanassiou, supra n.1. 




avoid a wave of new losses in the banking sector that could be transmitted all across 
the euro area.”24 
European leaders called for a comprehensive strategy for growth and investment in 
Greece in the European summit held on 21 July.  A task force will be appointed to 
establish the details of how European Union structural funds could be used to that end. 
“If unused EU structural funds are used to leverage further loans from the EIB, there 
may be some €16bn available over the next two to three years. It should be reallocated 
to an Economic Revival Fund and used to boost growth and competitiveness, by 
improving the quality of higher education; helping to lower labor costs; and 
supporting enterprise and innovation. Only intervention will trigger the necessary shift 
of resources as long as the price system delivers the wrong signals.”25 
Even more important is the commitment to investments that will stimulate the 
economy, create jobs and increase tax revenues. “Growth cannot be restored unless 
lending, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, increases. The increased 
flexibility given to the EFSF may help, but I suspect more needs to be done, for 
instance through creating a small business revolving fund.”26 
3. Improving the conditions for economic performance over the long term 
This involves raising: 
a) the quantity of the economy’s fundamental inputs (such as labor and capital, whose 
supply ultimately curbs the level of output); 
b) the quality of these inputs, which can increase the “raw” labor and capital; 
c) the ease with which the economy adjusts to continual change (new technologies, new 
competitors, new patterns of demand); and  
                                                 
24 Lewellyn & Peace, supra n.5. 
25 Pisani-Ferry, Jean “Europe must intervene to get Greece growing“ Financial Times (London, 27 July 2011). 
26 Stiglitz, supra n. 18. 




d) the economy’s resilience to shocks (for instance, changes in the price of oil or in the 
volume of exports) that affect some regions more than others. 
4. Putting in place policies to avoid future crises of the scale seen recently 
This category may be divided into two groups: microprudential policy27 and macroprudential 
policy28.  
a) Within microprudential regulation, capital requirements and cross-borders issues have 
been addressed by the new Basel 3 regime and the establishment of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) respectively.  
The Basel 3 regime raises “the minimum common-equity capital requirements for 
banks from effectively 2% to at least 7% of risk-weighted assets (RWA), with 
“systemically important” banks expected to maintain even higher capital levels 
(Switzerland has demanded at least 10% for its large banks). Basel 3 also introduces 
new liquidity requirements for banks (sufficient liquid assets need to be held against a 
potential bank run, and long-term assets must be financed by long-term liabilities), and 
Basel 3 introduces for the first time in some countries a cap on overall gross 
leverage.”29 
The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) were approved by the European 
Parliament in September 2010 and came into operation at the beginning of 2011. It 
includes a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – made up of EU central bank 
governors and chaired by the President of the ECB - and three pan-EU watchdogs 
given power to intervene in financial markets and settle disputes among national 
regulators: the European Banking Authority (based in London), the European 
                                                 
27 Microprudential policies are aimed at increasing the resilience of individual banks to shocks. 
28 Macroprudential policies are aimed at “preventing the build-up of unsustainable deficit/debt positions, 
whether in the public or the private sectors”. Source: N4. 
29 Lewellyn & Peace, supra n.5. 




Securities and Markets Authority (based in Hamburg), and the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pension Authority (based in Frankfurt). 
b) Macroprudential policies are required in order to protect the financial system since a 
domino run deposit is always a possibility. Given the fact that banks borrow short and 
lend long, they are “always intrinsically vulnerable to a run on deposits. Typically a 
run begins with the bank or banks that are in the weakest position: and then, if they 
fail, it moves on to the next-most vulnerable bank or banks. The failure of successive 
US investment banks, which culminated in the collapse of Lehman Brothers, is an 
ever-present reminder of the risk of domino failure.”30 
If private sector ill-discipline reaches systemic scale, it becomes a public debt 
problem. To avoid this possibility, it would be necessary to create one or more 
instruments to control private sector credit in the aggregate. These are to be carefully 
constructed and sensitively administered to not constrain economic growth 
unnecessarily. 
As for the banking sector, according to the new Basel 3 regime, “a countercyclical 
common-equity capital buffer of up to 2.5% of GDP is proposed when a country’s 
private sector credit/GDP exceeds trend. This would apply both to domestic banks 
and, pro rata, to foreign banks operating in the overheating economy. The purpose is 
to slow bank lending through higher capital requirements and thereby slow the 
formation of excess leverage”.31 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 




Nonetheless, a study32 recently published by the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS) states that “elements of Basel III, such as the liquidity coverage ratio 
and the risk-weighted part of the capital buffers, by encouraging banks to hold more 
sovereign debt could contribute to the next crisis, rather than prevent it.” The paper 
identifies a “vicious circle between the conditions of public finances and those of 
banks. As banks’ funding costs worsen, so does the creditworthiness of the sovereign, 
which in turn heightens funding costs. If such a vicious circle does indeed exist, then 
incentivizing banks to hold more sovereign debt in order to fulfill regulatory 
requirements would only compound the problem”.  
In this case, the CGFS advises as follows. “If governments do not return rapidly to 
sustainable fiscal trajectories, and the risks on their sovereign debt remain elevated, 
authorities should closely monitor the interaction of sovereign risk with regulatory 
policies which provide banks with strong incentives to hold large amounts of 
government debts. In this new environment, the preferential treatment of government 
debt (particularly that which is lower-rated) relative to private debt may be less 
justified.”33 
In the end, the integrity of an economy´s financial system can be guaranteed only by 
the state. This requires the state to have “sufficient ‘head room’ or ‘fiscal space’… to 
assume responsibility for any likely level of private sector debt without degrading the 
capacity of the state to service the resulting public debt. This requires long-term fiscal 
discipline to limit the size of the public debt. 
                                                 
32 Committee on the Global Financial System “The impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding conditions” 
CGFS Papers N° 43 (July 2011). 
33 Ibid. 




With respect to fiscal ill-discipline,34 there have been some European moves towards 
enforcing greater fiscal discipline and centralized monitoring, control and enforcement 
over the public finances of Member states. Some of them are as follows:  
a) Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP).35 The Commission has proposed that “ (1) a numerical 
benchmark be used to assess the extent to which a participating Member State's 
government debt ratio declines at a satisfactory pace; (2) national budgetary 
frameworks be measured against a set of minimum requirements regarding, 
among others, statistics, numerical rules and forecasting systems; and (3) that 
compliance with fiscal rules and/or recommendations be reinforced through 
financial, peer review and political measures, applied earlier and in a more 
gradual manner compared with those provided for under the existing framework 
(which can only be adopted by majority voting on conclusion of the EDP).” 
b) Deepening and broadening coordination. Coordination has been mainly enhanced 
through the European Semester - implemented in January 2011 -: the reference is 
to the “six-month annual period during which Member States´ budgetary and 
structural policies will be reviewed to detect any inconsistencies and 
                                                 
34 In aggregate, the euro area’s current public-debt problems are slightly less severe than those of the US. “In 
2010, and on a common (Maastricht) basis, the general government131 consolidated gross debt of the euro area 
16 averaged just over 84% of GDP, while the equivalent US figure was 6 percentage points higher, at just over 
92%. In 2012, the euro area figure is projected by the European Commission, on present policies, to increase by 
around 4 percentage points, to 88%, while the US is projected to rise by almost 10 percentage points, to just over 
102%.” Source: Lewellyn & Peace, supra n.5. 
35 On September 29, 2010, the Commission proposed a comprehensive package of legislative Measures, “the 
adoption of which would signal a far-reaching review of EU economic governance arrangements, with an 
emphasis on the SGP and the EDP. The legislative package (see COM(2010) 522, COM(2010) 526 final, 
COM(2010)527 final, COM(2010) 523, COM(2010) 524 final, COM(2010) 525 final) consists of six pieces of 
draft legislation: four proposals dealing with fiscal issues, including a reform of the SGP, and two new 
regulations aiming at detecting and addressing emerging macroeconomic imbalances within the EU and EMU.” 
Source: Athanassiou, supra n.1. 




imbalances.”36 The objective of this monitoring mechanism is to reinforce 
coordination while budgetary decisions are still under preparation.   
c) Fostering stronger institutions. To this end, national public institutions have been 
established to provide independent analysis and forecasts on domestic fiscal 
policy matters. 
d) Establishing a mechanism for macro-prudential surveillance. This involves a two-
stage process. The first includes an annual assessment of the macroeconomic 
imbalances and vulnerabilities of the eurozone. “This assessment would be based 
on a number of macroeconomic and financial indicators, each assigned 
lower/upper limits to denote risk thresholds. The variables to be monitored could 
include: current account balances, net foreign assets, measures of competitiveness, 
credit growth, and changes in house prices”. The second part of the process 
involves “continued monitoring of the variables, and strict enforcement of the 
thresholds.”37 
At the same time, there is a need to provide for an “orderly unwinding of excessive debt 
positions” and a permanent crisis resolution mechanism. 
The need for a permanent crisis resolution mechanism has been addressed by the European 
Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) which will be a permanent replacement of the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). 
On March 25, 2011, the European Council adopted a decision based on the newly introduced 
“simplified revision procedure” of art.48(6) TEU. The decision -which inserts a new para.3 
into art.136 TFEU, allowing for the establishment of the ESM-38 is to enter into force on 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Lewellyn & Peace, supra n. 5. 
38 Decision amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a 
stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the Euro [2010] OJ L91/1. The amendment reads as 




January 1, 2013, subject to all Member States notifying the Secretary General of the Council 
of the completion of the procedures for its approval “in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements”.39  
The ESM would be activated, whenever necessary, “to safeguard the economic and financial 
stability of the Euro area, with temporary financial assistance being granted subject to strict 
policy conditionality.40 The ESM itself is to be established by virtue of a treaty among the 
Euro area Member States, signed on July 11, 2011 as an intergovernmental organisation of 
public international law, located in Luxembourg.”41 
THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY FACILITY: FEATURES AND 
LEGAL ASPECTS 
On May 8, 2010, “the ECOFIN42 Council and the Eurogroup reached an agreement on a 
financial support package for Greece, conditional upon the adoption by the Greek 
Government of a range of economic and fiscal measures.43 The support package comprised 
EU80 billion, in the form of centrally pooled bilateral loans from Greece's Euro area partners, 
and EU30 billion, in the form of an IMF-sponsored loan. The European component of the 
support package was activated on May 9, 2010, with the signature of a Loan Facility 
Agreement.44 In May 2010, that package was inter alia backed by (1) a Council Regulation 
                                                                                                                                                        
follows: “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial 
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.” 
39 Article 2 of Decision amending art.136 of the Treaty. 
40 “Conditionality refers to the honoring, by the beneficiaries of financial assistance, of any budgetary austerity, 
privatization and structural reform commitments they may have undertaken vis-à-vis their EU partners, the IMF 
and the ECB, as a condition precedent for their access to the ESM.” 
41 Athanassiou, supra note 1. 
42 Economic and Financial Affairs Council. 
43 These conditions have been stipulated in “Decision 2010/320 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing 
and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged 
necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit [2010] OJ L145/6.” 
44 The Loan Facility Agreement between the 14 Euro area Member States and KfW, on the one hand, and the 
Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, on the other, is available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr 
[Accessed July 5, 2011]. 




establishing a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM),45 to extend financial 
assistance to EU Member States in difficulty, in the form of interest-bearing loans or credit 
lines,46 and (2) an inter-governmental agreement among the Euro area Member States, 
complementing the EFSM with a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), in the form of 
a special purpose vehicle,47 to provide a further EU440 billion in financial assistance.” 48 
The EFSF issues bonds on the market, “using pro rata basis guarantees by all Euro area 
Member States who commit up front to their share of EU440 billion, providing loans at 
interest rates determined on the basis of a pricing formula consistent with the IMF lending 
rates. Issues can be made via syndications but, also, auctions, private placements, new lines 
and tap issues. In the case of an issue by auction, the German Debt Management Office 
(Finanzagentur) is to act as issuance agent and be responsible for the placement, with the 
EFSF as the issuer.”49 
To access the EFSF, Member States first need to agree on a “macroeconomic adjustment 
program with the Commission and the Eurogroup, in liaison with the ECB and, depending on 
the circumstances, also the IMF. The Eurogroup retains its decision-making responsibility, in 
particular with regard to the evaluation of conditionality and the authorization of 
disbursements. The EFSF was activated on January 25, 2011 with a landmark five-year bond 
auction worth EU5 billion to raise funds for Ireland and was expected to provide an estimated 
EU78 billion worth of aid to Portugal.” 
                                                 
45 Regulation 407/2010 Establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism [2010] OJ L 118/1. The legal 
basis for that Regulation was art. 122(2) TFEU. 
46 “It is the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after hearing the 
views of the ECB, which decides upon the activation of the EFSM, the funds of which, in the order of EU60 
billion, are guaranteed by the EU budget and secured by borrowing on the capital markets or from financial 
institutions. Close to the time of the finalization of this article, the Commission had issued, on behalf of the 
European Union, a EU4.75 billion bond with a 10-year maturity to fund disbursements of the assistance 
packages to Ireland and Portugal. Ireland was to receive EU3 billion and Portugal EU1.75 billion 
from the disbursements.” 
47 “The SPV was established by the EFSF Framework Agreement of June 7, 2010 (available at 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu [Accessed July 5, 2011], as a Luxembourg law public limited liability company, for a 
period of three years.” 
48 Athanassiou, supra note 1. 
49 Ibid. 




As for the legality of the above mentioned rescue package, and bearing in mind that financial 
support measures lie outside the scope of the exclusive competences of the EU, it is due to 
examine (1) the interpretation of Art.125 TFEU (the no-bail out clause), and (2) an 
understanding of the relationship between the no-bail out clause and Art. 122(2) TFEU (the 
financial solidarity clause), which was the legal basis for the adoption of the Council 
Regulation. 
Article 125(1)TFEU provides that: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments of central governments of … any Member State … [a] Member State shall not 
be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments… of another Member State, 
without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project 
….”. Its objective is “to reinforce the Member States' fiscal discipline by avoiding the moral 
hazards to which mutual assistance expectations could expose them.”50 
On a literal interpretation of the no-bail out clause, “the mere financing by the Union of a 
Member State's liabilities, through bilateral loans (or credit lines), lies outside its ambit, 
provided that such loans or credit lines are genuine, in the sense of being discretionary, 
interest or fee-bearing (hence, non-concessionary) and temporary in nature, as in the case of 
those provided by the Member States in 2010 and envisaged by the Council Regulation. To 
lend is not to assume any obligations, as loans are “assets” (unlike obligations, which are 
“liabilities”).51 
It follows that the no-bail out clause prohibits the “substitution of one Member State debtor by 
another (or, a fortiori, by the Union as a whole), whether at the instance of the original 
                                                 
50 M. Kerber, Währungsunion mit Finanzausgleich? Eine Klarstellung zur Legalität von Finanzhilfen für 
Finanznotstandsstaaten der Eurozone, Europolis, Occasional Paper 1/2010, p.7, at http://www.europolis-
online.org [Accessed July 5, 2011]. 
51 Athhanassiou, supra n.1. 




Member State debtor or at that of any third party wishing to hold the Union or any of its 
Member States liable (in law) for the debts of another.”52 
A teleological reading of the no-bail out clause confirms that “its prohibition is unlikely to 
have been intended as a blanket one. For, while it is true that Art.125 TFEU is “a crucial 
element of [the] stability within the Union” and “an essential part of the ‘budgetary code’ of 
the Union”, its ban would not necessarily apply in a situation where an “unprecedented global 
financial crisis and economic downturn” have provoked such “a strong deterioration in the 
deficit and debt positions of the Member States” that “this situation, if not addressed as a 
matter of urgency, could represent a serious threat to the financial stability of the European 
Union as a whole.”53 
“Invoking, as some have54, the no-bail out clause indiscriminately to declare illegal any 
manner of temporary financial assistance to a Member State in difficulty would be 
tantamount, first, to disregarding the common interest in the maintenance of price stability 
(explicitly recognized, in its own right, as a Treaty objective, by Art.3(3) TEU as well as 
Art.127(1) (ex Art.105(1) EC) TFEU and Art.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB); 
secondly, to taking risks with Union-wide economic and financial stability; and thirdly, to 
ignoring the principle of solidarity, enshrined in Art.3(3) TEU as one of the guiding principles 
for Union action. Ultimately, if temporary financial assistance, with conditionality, can help 
Member States return to fiscal discipline (rather than default), the fiscal discipline objective of 
Art.125 TFEU is well served.”55 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Kerber, “Währungsunion mit Finanzausgleich? ”, Europolis, 2010, pp.7--8, at http://www.europolis-online.org 
[Accessed July 5, 2011]; T. Jeck, “ Euro-Rettungsschirm bricht EU-Recht und Deutsches Verfassungsrecht ”, 
cepStudie (July 5, 2010), p.4, at http://www.cep.eu [Accessed July 5, 2011]; M. Seidel, Der Euro-Schutzschild 
oder Falle, ZEI Working Paper, B 01 2010, pp.8--9, at http://www.zei.de [Accessed July 5, 2011]; H. Kube and 
E. Reimer, “ Grenzen des Europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus ” [2010] NJW 1911, 1912--1913; “ 
Europäische Verträge verbieten eine Rettung ”, FAZ.com (February 11, 2010), at http://www.faz.net [Accessed 
July 5, 2011]. 
55 Athanassiou, supra n.1. 




A contextual/systematic interpretation of the no-bail out clause corroborates the conclusion 
that “the prescribed ban was not intended as an absolute one. Referring to the interplay 
between the no-bail out clause, on the one hand, and Art.126 TFEU and the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP),56on the other, one commentator has aptly observed that “the authors of the 
Treaty realized that it is not wise to be exaggeratedly confident of the reactions of the markets 
in order to maintain financial stability”, which is why “it was … thought necessary to 
supplement the [no-bail out clause] with …specific rules addressed to the budgetary policy of 
the Member States.”57 
In regard to the interaction between the no-bail out clause and Art. 122(2) TFEU, the latter 
provides that “where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe 
difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union 
financial assistance to the Member State concerned.” 
The consensus among legal scholars is that Art. 122(2) TFEU establishes “an exception (or a 
“counterweight”) to the no-bail out clause, the very existence of which contradicts the 
assertion that no form of Union financial assistance is possible to a Euro area Member 
State.”58 After all, both provisions form part of the same chapter of the TFEU “(suggesting 
that both have a bearing on economic policy)59 and lie in close proximity to one another 
                                                 
56 See “Stability and Growth Pact, supplemented by Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [1997] OJ L209/1; Regulation 
1467/97 of on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [1997] OJ 
L209/6; and Regulation 479/2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed 
to the Treaty establishing the European Community (Codified version) [2009] OJ L145/1.” 
57 Louis, “The no-bail out clause and rescue packages” (2010) 47 C.M.L. Rev. 971, 978. 
58 Louis, “The no-bail out clause and rescue packages” (2010) 47 C.M.L. Rev. 971, 981--982; P. Vigneron, “ 
Réflexions sur le soutien financier à la Grèce -- Pour une lecture moins politique du Traité ” (2010) 541 Revue 
du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne 489, 490--491. 
59 See, for instance, J. Heß, “Finanzielle Unterstützung von EU-Mitgliedstaaten in einer Finanz-und 
Wirtschaftskrise und die Vereinbarkeit mit EU-Recht ” (2010) 4 Zeitschrift für das Juristische Studium 473, 475. 




(pointing to the conclusion that they need to be read in conjunction with rather than in 
isolation from one another).”60 
The idea that the no-bail out clause must always prevail over Art. 122(2) TFEU61 should be 
dismissed for two reasons: “first, because these two clauses are normatively equal to one 
another (hence the issue of deciding which of the two is hierarchically superior does not arise 
in the first place, absent any indication to the effect that either of them can be regarded as lex 
specialis )62; secondly, because, if the above were to hold true, Art.122(2) TFEU would lose 
its meaning.” 
As a conclusion, “in deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion under Art. 122(2) 
TFEU, the Union has to have regard to Art.125 TFEU, satisfying itself that the conditions of 
the financial solidarity clause are fulfilled in each individual case before this can be activated. 
In this way, it is argued that “while an excessive deficit would not per se qualify as an 
“exceptional occurrence” within the meaning of Art.122(2) TFEU, its transformation into a 
threat to sovereign solvency would fit the primary law description, since the choice for the 
Member State concerned would no longer be between an immediate return to budgetary 
rectitude or continued market lending at higher (punitive) risk premia but, rather, between 
borrowing at sustainable conditions and outright default.”63 
Thus, for the reasons explained above, Art.125 TFEU is compatible with the extension of 
emergency financial assistance to a Euro area Member State, “which is experiencing, or is 
                                                 
60 Athanassiou, supra note. 1. 
61 “This assertion is based inter alia on a Declaration on the Treaty of Nice, dated February 26, 2001, concerning 
art.100 EC (now art.122 TFEU), which recalls that decisions regarding financial assistance, such as are provided 
for in art.100 EC, must be “compatible with the no-bailout rule laid down in Article 103 TEC (now, art. 125 
TFEU)”. 
62 See Heß, “Finanzielle Unterstützung von EU-Mitgliedstaaten in einer Finanz-und Wirtschaftskrise und die 
Vereinbarkeit mit EU-Recht ” (2010) 4 Zeitschrift für das Juristische Studium 473, 476. „If anything, it is the 
opposite conclusion that one may draw, on the basis of the well-established lex specialis derogat lex generalis 
principle of statutory interpretation.” 
63 Ibid. 




seriously threatened with, a severe economic or financial disturbance caused by exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control”, whether by its partners or by the Union itself.64 
Finally, on 21 July 2011, the Council increased the flexibility given to the EFSF and ESM to 
allowing them to: 
- act on the basis of a precautionary program; 
- finance recapitalization of financial institutions through loans to governments 
including in non program countries ;  
- intervene in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing the 
existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability 
and on the basis of a decision by mutual agreement of the EFSF/ESM Member States, 
to avoid contagion. 
Thus, the new powers given to the EFSF constitute the next step towards the establishment of 
a European Monetary Fund.65  
A EUROPEAN MONETARY FUND AS A POLICY TO AVOID FUTURE 
CRISES 
Among the ideas for addressing the European debt problem since the beginning of the 
financial crisis, one has been largely endorsed:66 the establishment of a European Monetary 
Fund (EMF), proposed by Gros and Mayer,67 as an independent institution to tackle the 
                                                 
64 Regulation 407/2010 art.1. 
65 “The European Council of 21 July 2011, effectively decided to transform the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) into a European Monetary Fund by allowing it to engage in precautionary programmes and even 
to acquire debt at a discount on the secondary market. French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared proudly that 
euro area leaders “have agreed to create the beginnings of a European Monetary Fund”. Source: Gros & 
Giovannini “The EFSF as a EMF: Does it have enough resources? CEPS Policy Brief No. 408, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels (July 2011). 
66 German Chancellor Merkel and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Shäuble have supported the idea, 
although recognising that, without amendments to the Treaty, establishing an EMF would not be possible. 
67 D. Gros and T. Mayer, “How to deal with sovereign default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary 
Fund”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 202, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels (February 2010); D. Gros and 
T. Mayer, “How to Deal with the Threat of Sovereign Default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund” 
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solvency problems of EMU Member States in difficulty, through the provision of emergency 
loans or guarantees for the issuance of public debt. 
The analogy with the IMF, nonetheless, should not be stretched too far, because of “both the 
unique features of the European Union, against the background of which the proposed EMF 
would operate, and the sui generis financing mechanism suggested for it - a direct penalty 
payment for countries with an excessive debt or deficit ratio.”68 
The features of the proposal to establish a EMF are as follows: 
1. Principle of solidarity and enhanced cooperation 
The creation of the EMF would be a concrete expression of the principle of solidarity 
enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, emphasizing in this case the particular responsibility of euro 
area Member States to avoid creating difficulties for their partners.69 
Moreover, according to the proponents, the EMF could be implemented within the framework 
of enhanced cooperation as laid down in Art. 20 TEU  and in Art. 326 TFEU. “Should the 
Council establish that the implementation of the Union’s objectives will not be attained within 
a reasonable period of time by the Union as a whole, as a last resort it can authorize enhanced 
cooperation in this area by a group of at least nine Member States, enabling those Member 
States to proceed more quickly. Nevertheless, participation must be open to every other State 
which complies with any conditions laid down by the authorizing decision.”70 
The sixteen States of the eurozone can be considered as such a group, but participation in 
enhanced cooperation is optional and, what is more, “EMU is, in and of itself, a special form 
of differentiated integration and may not, for that reason, be amenable to enhanced 
cooperation within the meaning of the Treaty.”71 
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“The closer “coordination and surveillance” among the Euro area Member States 
contemplated in the newly introduced Art.136 TFEU would appear to provide, subject to 
certain adjustments, the only acceptable legal basis for establishing a Euro area support fund, 
and for laying down the conditions subject to which its support could be granted to Member 
States in need”. This despite the fact that a “fund providing assistance to Member States in 
need can only indirectly be said to be “strengthening the coordination and surveillance of their 
budgetary discipline”, as per Art.136 (1)(a) TFEU.” Given its permanent nature and Euro area 
scope, Art.122(2) TFEU -the legal basis for the emergency-motivated EFSM- could not 
provide an appropriate foundation for setting up a permanent EFM.”72 
Another consideration to take into account is that “as part of the regular budgetary procedure 
at national level, state guarantees are subject to parliamentary assent. Should those guarantees 
have to be drawn upon in the future, whether by the ESM or by the EFSF, those Member 
States whose Constitutions contain balanced budget provisions (so called “debt brakes”) could 
run the risk of transcending them, especially if the drawings on those guarantees were to be 
substantial. Should such a situation materialize, delicate questions could arise of relevance to 
the relationship between constitutional, Union and public international law, and their 
normative hierarchy.”73 
Indeed, similar questions have arisen before in the jurisprudence of the Germany's Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), “which is of significant relevance in this 
regard as, within the European Union, debt brakes were, at the time of writing, a feature of 
German Constitutional law only.74 “The Solange jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional 
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74 “The reference is to art.115(2) of the German Constitution, which stipulates that, as of 2016, the Federal 
Government's structural deficit cannot exceed 0.35% of Germany's GDP. Similar provisions already apply in 
Switzerland (art.126 of the Swiss Federal Constitution) and the United States (s.4 of the 14th Amendment of the 
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budgetary restrictions, while France's lower house approved a Bill to enshrine budget restraint rules in the 
French Constitution. If approved by the French Senate, the proposed change would need to be approved by 
referendum or by a three-fifths majority across both houses.” Source: Ibid. 




Court75 and, in particular, its Solange III or “Maastricht judgment”76 suggests that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has “put itself in the position of supervising any further European 
integration”,77 and that there is still room for “a nationally assertive position”,78 with all the 
uncertainties that this is bound to entail at so crucial a juncture.79 This is without prejudice to 
the amendment of the German Constitution to conform to the principles enunciated by the 
Federal Constitutional Court in its Maastricht judgment.”80 
Since then, Union law can only be subjected to constitutional review by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht “where it is asserted that its evolution has fallen below the 
requisite standards of fundamental rights protection and democracy guaranteed by the German 
Constitution or is out of tune with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality or the 
conferred powers doctrine. The Federal Constitutional Court has more recently applied much 
the same reasoning to the assessment of the compatibility of the Act Approving the Treaty of 
Lisbon with the German Constitution.” 81 
 
                                                 
75 “Order of May 29, 1974 (Solange I) 37 BVerfGE 271; and Order of October 22, 1986 (Solange II), 73 
BVerfGE 339”. Source: Atanasious 
76 “Order of October 12, 1993 (Maastricht) 89 BVerfGE 155.” 
77 K.D. Makowski, “Solange III: The German Federal Constitutional Court's Decision on Accession to the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union” (1995) 16 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business 
Law 155, 176. 
78 K.M. Meessen, “Hedging European Integration: The Maastricht Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany” (1993) 17Fordham International Law Journal 511, 512. 
 
79 It is worth recalling that, according to the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange III, “The 
concept of the currency union as a ‘community based on stability’ (Stabilitätsgemeinschaft ) is the basis and 
subject matter of the German Act of Accession. If the monetary union should fail to deliver on a continuing basis 
the stability present at the beginning of the third stage of EMU within the meaning of the agreed mandate for 
stabilisation, it would be abandoning the Treaty conception and thereby fall outside the authority conferred in the 
Act of Accession” (at [90]). Moreover, “Under the EU Treaty, monetary union is no more apt to give 
rise,automatically, to a political union than to an economic union. That would require an amendment of the 
Treaty, which could not happen without a decision of the national State institutions, including the Bundestag ” 
(at [93]). 
80 “Article 23(1) of the German Constitution, providing for the participation of Germany in the development of 
an EU that is committed to democratic, social, and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of 
subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by 
this Basic Law.” 
81 “Order of June 30, 2009 (Lisbon), 123 BVerfGE 267. Interestingly, however, the Federal Constitutional Court 
found that the accompanying Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in 
European Union Matters infringed arts 38.1 and 23.1 of the Basic Law, insofar as the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and 
Treaty amendment procedures”. 




2. Financing mechanism  
The financing mechanism of the EMF will be made through contributions, in terms of 
penalties, from those Member States that do not comply with the budgetary discipline 
established in Union law. This would have the double virtue of creating additional incentive 
to comply with the budgetary discipline as laid down in Union law and generating resources 
that could be used to solve a crisis, should such a situation reappear.82 
One of the problems pointed out as far as the financing mechanism is concerned is that the 
proposal “puts the entire onus of the crisis resolution on delinquent countries, with no mutual 
assistance from other EU (or euro area) countries. Furthermore, to make only delinquent 
countries pay for assistance would be politically untenable. Sooner or later the payers would 
claim possession of the fund and deny any right in deciding how to use it to those who had not 
contributed to it. The two aims of strengthening the hand of the virtuous countries and of 
making the non-virtuous pay for assistance are mutually incompatible.”83 
Another argument84 against the EMF funding mechanism is the possibility of the EMF 
turning into a threat for European integration. “Fiscally sound northern European countries –
particularly Germany – would fear being indirectly forced (and to some extent blackmailed, 
because of the contagious effects of a default) to bail out fiscally profligate EMU countries. 
At first glance, this fear seems to be mitigated by the fact that the EMF should be partly 
financed by countries with excess debts and deficits. But northern European countries would 
have to participate in the initial funding and would eventually be liable for the loans which the 
EMF most likely would have to take out in large amounts in order to obtain sufficient 
resources for crisis resolutions. Thus, because northern European countries would feel 
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84 Matthes, Jürgen “The EMF is Better Suited than a EMF to Deal with Potential Sovereign Defaults in the 
Eurozone” Intereconomics Forum 2 (2010): 75-81. 




exploited, voters in these parts of the eurozone might turn against EMU. In the end, it is 
imaginable that northern European countries could even leave the eurozone – in order to form 
a new currency union.”85 
From a legal perspective, the EMF shall be financed through payments from those Member 
States that do not meet the reference values for government debt (60% in relation to GDP) 
and for the budgetary deficit (3% in relation to GDP) as stated in Art. 126 TFEU in 
conjunction with the Protocol (N° 12) on the EDP. According to Art 126 (11) TFEU, Member 
States failing to comply with this budgetary discipline may be subject to sanctions- 
enumerated in an exhaustive way- which, in the worst case, would be high fines. These 
sanctions are not limited to the mere exceeding of the reference values, but to the formal 
decision proclaiming the existence of an excessive deficit. As a result, Art.126 TFEU does not 
allow payment obligations in terms of contributions to the EMF.86 
3. Borrowing money from the markets 
This aspect, according to the proponents, could manage the issuance of a common euro 
government bond in the future. In fact, the issuance of Eurobonds as a means of putting an 
end to the sovereign debt crisis87 has been one of the most prominent ideas advanced since the 
onset of the financial crisis. The proponents of the idea of Eurobonds88 conceived them “as 
primary market, European (that is, common to all Member States) sovereign bonds, issued by 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Häde, supra note 69. 
87 ”J.-C. Juncker and G. Tremonti, “E-bonds would end the crisis”, Financial Times, December 5, 2010. The idea 
of issuing some sort of “Eurobonds” had earlier been considered by scholars, some of whom were against it. For 
instance, in favour, see P. De Grauwe and W. Moesen, “Gains for all: A Proposal for a Common Euro Bond” 
(2009) 3 Intereconomics 132 (Eurobonds to be issued through the EIB, based on a guarantee proportional to the 
Member States' participation in the EIB's capital, with the proceeds also allocated proportionately to their 
participation in the EIB's capital); J. Delpla and J. von Weizsäcker, “The Blue Bond Proposal”, Bruegel Policy 
Brief 2010/03 (May 2010) (separation of the Member States' debt in blue and red tranches--the former covering 
debt below 60 per cent of GDP and the latter all debt in excess thereof--and pooling together of the blue 
tranches, to create a deep government bond market and reduced borrowing costs on the blue tranche, creating 
incentives for Member States to keep their debt to 60% of their GDP or below). Contra, see W. Kösters, 
“Common Euro Bonds -- No Appropriate Instrument” (2009) 3 Intereconomics 135.” 
88 The Italian Finance Minister and the President of the Eurogroup called for the issuance of Eurobonds in 
December 2010. 




a “European Debt Agency” (EDA)89 as a successor to the EFSF. The EDA would finance up 
to 50 per cent (in exceptional cases 100 per cent) of new debt issues by its members, but never 
beyond 40 per cent of their GDP (so as not to breach the Maastricht limits).”90 
The EDA could also “stabilize the secondary market for national debt by offering Member 
States in difficulty the possibility to swap outstanding national bonds for Eurobonds at a 
discount, the size of which would depend on market conditions. Eurobonds would enjoy a 
higher priority than national debt and would qualify as eligible collateral for Eurosystem 
credit operations. As Eurobond interest rates would be lower than their national rates, at least 
in the case of Member States suffering from fiscal imbalances, the refinancing through 
Eurobonds of a large portion of their existing debt would improve both their solvency and 
their liquidity position.”91 
The principle of borrowing money from financial markets on behalf of the Member States of 
the European Union has a precedent. This principle had been previously applied to offer 
financial support to some Member States of the European Union but that lie outside the 
eurozone to help them out of their critical balance of payments crisis (Art 143 TFEU).92 
Thus, in 2008 and 2009, the European Union agreed to lend EU6.5 billion to Hungary, EU3.1 
billion to Latvia and around EU6 billion to Romania. “These Member States received 
emergency loans from the IMF and European Union when their budgets were hit hard by the 
global economic downturn. The Commission is empowered to contract borrowings on the 
capital markets or with financial institutions, using the creditworthiness of the Union to 
guarantee troubled countries' debts.”93 
 
                                                 
89 The idea of creating an EDA had been floated in March 2010 by the Belgian Prime Minister, Yves Leterme. 
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92 Seyad, Sideek “A legal analysis of the European Financial Stability Mechanism” Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation (2011). 
93 Council Regulation 332/2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member 
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4. Call on the guarantees 
In the event that Member State faces financial difficulties, it could, upon submission of an 
adjustment program, call in the guarantees of the Fund in an amount equivalent to its 
previously deposited contributions. Additional drawings would depend on the agreement of 
further conditions and financial budgetary disciplinary restraint.94 
A factor that could complicate the development of this facility would be the political process 
of negotiating a stabilization program as well as the political independence of the EMF staff 
in charge of such a task.95 The council has so far delegated the unpopular role of imposing 
technocratic solutions against the will of democratic governments to an outside agency- the 
IMF.  
Potential problems with time-inconsistency and with the lack of credibility of the conditions 
to be imposed by the EMF have been also pointed out. “The threat of continuously enforcing 
strict fiscal discipline no longer appears credible in times of large-scale protests directed 
against EMU institutions or other EMU countries. The same applies to the SGP and the no-
bail out clause. The SGP´s threat to impose sanctions is counterproductive and also not 
credible if a county is in a deep fiscal crisis”.96   
5. Orderly sovereign default 
Provided that the financial support provided by the EMF does not suffice, a mechanism 
capable of managing an orderly default and debt restructuring of public and private debt is 
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also included. This would eliminate the risk of disorderly default, which is the main threat that 
Member States in a fiscal crisis pose to the systemic financial stability of the eurozone.97 
So far, such a procedure does not exist. As a result, the insolvency of one Member State 
would have incalculable consequences for other Member states, giving it a certain power for 
extortion. 
According to the proposal, the EMF shall guarantee an amount equivalent to 60% of the GDP 
of a Member State, which would make sovereign default a manageable risk.98 In order to limit 
the losses to financial institutions, the payments to the creditors of the insolvent Member State 
could be based on some form of Brady-bonds.99  This could save most European banks from 
sliding into another crisis.100 Derivatives and other transactions not previously registered with 
a special arm of the EMF dealing with the verification of public debt figures would not be 
exchanged. The transparency of public finances would be thus enhanced.  
At the same time, the moral hazard on the side of the creditors would be reduced as they 
would be prevented from pocketing high interest payments on Greek treasuries without facing 
a real default risk because they expected a generous financial rescue package by eurozone 
Member States.101  
However, the funding of the EMF – assuming that it would be based on the EFSF – would 
have to be much larger if Member States like Spain or Italy were to be rescued. “The problem 
of the eurozone is not Greece but the rise in market interest rates of Italy and Spain, two large 
countries in the eurozone’s core. The most important priority is the size and flexibility of the 
EFSF. At present, the overall size of the EFSF is €450bn. With a second Greek credit agreed 
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and second program for Ireland and Portugal very likely, the ceiling will not be big enough to 
bring in Spain, let alone Italy. To do that the ceiling would have to be doubled, or trebled. 
Without this increase, it is inconceivable that the eurozone can get through this crisis 
intact.”102 
For this reason, some argue that a better alternative is to introduce such a mechanism – an 
orderly default procedure- in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). One of the arguments 
behind this proposal is the fact that using the threat of an IMF intervention could eventually 
strengthen the eurozone´s institutional framework to discipline decentralized decision-making 
in fiscal policy. Besides, establishing an EMF would entail strongly interfering in the national 
sovereignty of eurozone Member States.103 
6. Amendments of the Treaties 
For the reasons explained above, certain aspects of the proposal could not be implemented 
under current Union law: 
- The financing mechanism through payments from those Member States that do not 
meet the reference values for government debt and for the budgetary deficit would be 
incompatible with Art.126 TFEU; 
- Guarantees for public debts and payments to the creditors of the insolvent State within 
the orderly insolvency proceedings would be incompatible with Art 125 (1) TFEU; 
- Any other deviation from the procedures established in the TFEU (participation of the 
ECB, voting rights limitations that are not provided for) or even expulsion from the 
Monetary Union. 
Therefore, it would be required to amend the Union Treaties.  
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The EU treaty provides for three different procedures to amend the Treaties:104 
- the ordinary revision procedure105 which may, inter alia, serve either to increase or 
reduce the competences of the Union on a proposal from a government, Parliament or 
the Commission to the Council which submits it to the European Council and notifies 
the national parliaments. After consulting Parliament and the Commission, the 
European Council decides by a simple majority in favor of examining the proposed 
amendments; 
- the simplified revision procedure106: this revision procedure concerns only provisions 
of Part III107 of the TFEU relating to the internal policies and action of the Union. The 
European Council, after consulting Parliament and the Commission, adopts an 
amending decision, which must be approved by the Member States. The decision may 
not extend the competences of the Union; 
- the so-called bridging amendment 108: where the TFEU or Title V of the EU council 
may authorize the council to act by qualified majority, except in the area of defence. 
Similarly, where adoption by the Council is provided via a special legislative 
procedure109, the European Council may authorize adoption via the ordinary 
legislative procedure110. These initiatives must act by unanimity after obtaining the 
consent of Parliament given by a majority of its components members. 
 
                                                 
104 Mathijsen P.S.R.F., A Guide to European Union Law as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (10th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2010). 
105 Art 48 (2) to (5) EU. 
106 Art. 48 (6) EU. 
107 Part III “Union Policies and Internal Action” inludes practically all the activities of the Union, except any 
external action. 
108 Art 48 (7) EU. 
109 Art 289 (2) TFEU. 
110 Art 294 TFEU. 




In this case, a key question is whether the conferral of additional policy areas from the 
Member States to the Union for the establishment of an EMF increases Union competences or 
not. 
Art. 48 (6) TEU - the simplified revision procedure- would apply provided there is no 
increase in the competences conferred to the Union. The ordinary revision procedure – Art. 48 
(3) TEU- would have to be applied given an increase in the Union competences. As a result, 
“a convention composed of representatives of the national Parliaments, of the Heads of State 
or Government of the Member States, of the European Parliament and of the Commission 
would have to be convened. However, the European Council could, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, decide to avoid a convention due to the limited extent of 
the proposed amendments and instead convene a conference of representatives of the 
governments of the Member States. The results of the convention or of the intergovernmental 
conference would then need to be ratified by all Member States before they could enter into 
force.”111 
CONCLUSION 
The European sovereign debt crisis, characterized by fiscal laxity, disregard for the budgetary 
discipline rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and banking sector immoderation, has drawn 
attention to the conflict between centralization of monetary policy and descentralization of 
fiscal policy, emphasizing the need for policies to avoid future crises in the European 
Monetary Union. 
Among the measures taken and proposals contemplated in response to the sovereign default 
stage of the financial crisis in the Euro area, this paper has examined features and legal 
aspects of the European Financial Stability Facility, as a temporary emergency tool, and the 
                                                 
111 Häde, supra note 69. 




different issues involved in the establishment of a European Monetary Fund, as a permanent 
institution. 
The European Financial Stability Facility, whose legal feasibility sparked great controversy, 
finds an adequate legal basis in Art. 122(2) TFEU in terms of extension of emergency Union 
financial assistance to Member States in difficulties, and is compatible, subject to conditions, 
with the prohibition of transfer liabilities enshrined in Art. 125 TFEU. 
The popular proposal to establish a European Monetary Fund – as a means to tackle the 
solvency problems of EMU Member States in difficulty through the provision of emergency 
loans or guarantees for the issuance of public debt – could be implemented under the newly 
introduced Art. 136 (3) TFEU which allows “closer coordination and surveillance” among the 
Euro area Members States. However, some aspects of the proposal – the financing mechanism 
or guarantees for public debts - could not be implemented under current Union law, and an 
amendment of the Treaties would be required, which, if leading to an increase in Union 
competences, would imply a long and hazardous process. 
The advantages of establishing a European Monetary Fund – an orderly sovereign default 
mechanism, incentives for fiscal discipline, transparency of public finances and reduction of 
the moral hazard problem – are thus constrained by the need to amend the Treaties and the 
condition to provide the fund with an adequate lending capacity able to support large 
economies. These two requirements involve decisive political will and leadership. 
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